

Composition, Identity, and Loss

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Abstract (141 words)

'It feels like I have lost a part of myself' is frequently uttered by those grieving the death of a loved one. Despite the ubiquity of such utterances, and the palpable sense they express something true, few philosophers have considered what, if anything, accounts for their truth. Here I develop a suggestion from Donald Baxter according to which Composition as Identity provides us a means to understand the grief utterances literally. In doing so, I identify and develop a version of Leibniz's Law required for Composition as Identity to account for the truth of the grief utterances. In turn, this principle helps shed light on Composition as Identity's central claim: that the parts are identical to the whole. By considering objections to the resulting view I construct a list of desiderata for other philosophers interested in accounting for the grief utterances.

0. Introduction

Everyone will die. Due to that, almost everyone will experience the death of a loved one. The grief and sense of loss that the survivor experiences differ significantly from the sadness felt when hearing of the death of a stranger. The loss of a loved one is deeply felt, and the depth of the loss is often expressed through the claim that in the loss of her loved one, the survivor lost a part of herself. Call such claims 'grief utterances'. Not only are grief utterances ubiquitous, they are often accompanied, and likely prompted, by the experience that the survivor is no longer complete.

One task of metaphysicians is to provide an account of the manifest world — the world that living human beings experience daily. In addition to observed phenomena like tables, colours, and smiles, it includes felt phenomena, such as the experience that in the death of a loved one, the survivor loses a part of herself. Yet, despite the work done on parthood and persons, few philosophers have considered what might make this true. In this paper, I develop Donald Baxter's (2005) suggestion that his version of composition as identity, indicated by uppercase 'Composition as Identity', and its abbreviation, 'CAI', can account for the truth of

grief utterances.¹ In doing so I have two goals. One is to develop a new version of CAI which (a) accounts for the truth of grief utterances, and (b) provides a novel interpretation of the claim that each part is identical to the whole.² The other, done by considering some implications of the resulting version of CAI, is to shed light on what a successful account of the grief utterances' truth will look like.

As Baxter's version of composition as identity differs significantly from more well-known versions according to which the parts are collectively identical, or almost identical, to the whole,³ §1 is devoted to familiarizing the reader with the details of the view. In §2, I explain how, given these details, we should understand Baxter's (2005) suggestion that CAI makes grief utterances true. In doing so, I highlight a crucial gap in CAI — it is currently missing a version of Leibniz's Law required (a) to make the grief utterances true, and (b) to vindicate the claim that the parts are *identical* to the whole. In §3, I develop the requisite version of Leibniz's Law, and, in §4, defend its ability to account for the grief utterances. In §5, I consider three objections to the resulting view as one that adequately captures the truth of the grief utterances. Two turn on what was noted in the beginning paragraph: that grief at the loss of a loved one differs from sadness at the death of a stranger, and that the phenomenology prompting the grief utterances includes the sense that the survivor is no longer complete. Yet, CAI also shows great promise in its ability to model that in losing a loved, every aspect of oneself is affected. In turn, these observations are used to motivate various desiderata for any account of the grief utterances.

Even those disinterested in the grief utterances may be interested in the discussion of CAI and Leibniz's Law found in sections 1-4. The version of composition as identity discussed in the paper is one on which the whole is (loosely, this will be made clearer shortly) *distributively*

¹ Lower-case 'composition as identity' is used throughout to indicate a family of views according to which there is identity (or something much like it) between a whole and its parts.

² Thanks to an anonymous referee for bringing to my attention that this portion of my paper is (a) more central, and (b) more novel, than I had made it seem in an earlier draft.

³ See Lewis (1991, Chapter 3.4-3.6).

identical to its parts, that is, the whole is identical to each of its parts taken individually.⁴ As identity is typically considered a one-one relation, this raises questions about Leibniz's Law, and which properties of the whole may also be said to be properties of the parts. While a substantial amount has been written about what formulation of Leibniz's Law we should use to understand the claim that the parts are *collectively* identical to the whole, that is, the parts taken together are identical to the whole, much less attention has been paid to the claim that the parts are distributively identical to the whole.⁵ §3 especially provides a variation of Leibniz Law that, when combined with other established versions of Leibniz Law for CAI, helps vindicate such a claim.

1. Baxter's Composition as Identity

Baxter's CAI is *not* the more familiar version according to which the parts are collectively identical (or almost identical) to the whole.⁶ Baxter's CAI may be better described as the view that each individual part is identical to the whole. But, even that is misleading. According to Baxter, parts and wholes do not even exist together, at least not in the same count. Counts are the first part of the machinery of CAI. On CAI, reality is multi-faceted.⁷ Each facet corresponds to a count. Objects exist in counts. An object exists in a count just in case it is counted in that count.⁸ Wholes and their parts never exist in the same count. Were they to exist in the same count, the number of objects in that count would be greater than common sense suggests. Imagine standing in a checkout aisle restricted to six items. You want to buy a six-pack. There are six cans in the six-pack, and there is the six-pack. If you counted each can *and* the six-pack, then you would find that you have seven items and need to leave the aisle. Clearly, this would be

⁴ Cf. McDaniel (2014)

⁵ For examples of work on Leibniz's Law and composition as *collective* identity see Bricker (2019), McDaniel (2008), Sider (2014) and Wallace (2011). Turner (2014) and Baxter (2018b) are examples of philosophers who have written on Leibniz Law regarding composition as *distributive* identity. McDaniel (2014) explores the idea that the parthood relation is a relation of distributive identity.

⁶ In this paper, I discuss Baxter's Composition as Identity described in his (1988a), (1988b), (1989), and (2018b), and consider elements of his theory of aspects found in his (2018a).

⁷ Cf. Baxter (1988a, p.581), and Baxter (1988b, p. 201)

⁸ Baxter (1988a, p. 576; 1988b, p. 200). These counts are not merely conventions for how and what we want to count, but are literally different facets of reality. Turner (2014) suggests Baxter's view is a version of ontological pluralism: some things exist in different ways (qua existing in different counts) than others. For discussions of ontological pluralism see Turner (2010) and McDaniel (2017).

a mistake in counting. However, since parts and wholes exist in distinct counts, we do not count them together. There is no count in which each of the six cans is counted alongside the six-pack. You need not leave the restricted aisle.

Although parts don't exist in the same count as the whole, *aspects* do. We can think of aspects as individuals as they are a certain way. Consider Eustace: he is an honest friend but at his job as a used car salesman Eustace is dishonest. This does not entail that Eustace is both honest and dishonest. Rather, Eustace has differing aspects: Eustace-as-a-friend, and Eustace-as-a-salesman. One is honest, one is dishonest. Let's use Turner's (2014) notation for aspects: where '**x**' denotes either an individual or an aspect, '**x**_{*y*}[F_{*y*}]' denotes the aspect **x**-as-it-is-F.⁹ So, we have Eustace_[friend *y*] and Eustace_[salesman *y*]. Eustace_[friend *y*] and Eustace_[salesman *y*] are the very same individual: Eustace. Since they exist in the same count as Eustace, say that they are *intra-count* identical to Eustace, a relation designated with '='.

However, since both Eustace_[friend *y*] and Eustace_[salesman *y*] are identical to Eustace, and one is honest and the other is dishonest, we seem to face the same problem: Eustace is both honest and dishonest. This is only an apparent contradiction as intra-count Leibniz's Law ranges only over individuals, not aspects. Let's use quantifiers bound to **boldface** variables to range over both aspects and the individuals they are aspects of. Quantifiers bound to *italicized* variables range only over individuals and are restricted to ignore aspects.¹⁰ The resulting version of Leibniz's Law is:

$$\textbf{Intra-Count Leibniz's Law (ILL): } \forall_{c1x} \forall_{c1y} (x=y \rightarrow (\Phi x \leftrightarrow \Phi y))$$

⁹ Throughout the paper I rely on the notational conventions and interpretation of Baxter from Turner (2014). This particular notation is also used in Baxter (2018b).

¹⁰ This notation is from Turner (2014). To help remember: 'bold' and 'both' each start with a 'b', 'italics' and 'individual' each start with an 'i'. The convention of using '=' for intra-count identity and '≈' for cross-count identity is also from Turner.

Note that the quantifiers are subscripted with alphanumeric characters. These index the quantifiers to counts. ILL thus tells us that, for any individuals, x and y , in the same count, if they are intra-count identical, then anything true of one is true of the other.

Although parts do not exist in the same count as the whole, there is another relation of identity, *cross-count identity*, indicated by ' \approx ', which holds between the parts in one count, and aspects of the whole in another. The parts are cross-count identical to *locational* aspects of the whole: the whole as it occupies a particular region.¹¹ Namely, the region the part *exactly* occupies, or is located. For the purposes of illustrating how CAI makes the grief utterances true, I will take the relevant whole to be entirely composed to two individuals: Barbara and Anne. Call the whole 'Barbara-Anne'. Take region R_B , in which Barbara is located. Let ' C_1 ' designate the count in which the parts, Barbara and Anne, but not the whole, Barbara-Anne, exist. In C_1 , Barbara *exactly occupies* R_B . That is, Barbara fills all and only R_B 's sub-regions. Let ' C_2 ' designate the count in which Barbara-Anne exists, but its parts do not. In C_2 , it is Barbara-Anne that fills all of R_B 's sub-regions. But, does not *exactly* occupy R_B , as it also fills regions beyond R_B . However, R_B *is* exactly occupied by Barbara-Anne _{y} [located at R_B y]. Barbara-Anne _{y} [located at R_B y] fills all and only R_B 's sub-regions. Regardless of counts, the stuff that fills all and only R_B 's sub-regions is the same. Barbara and Barbara-Anne _{y} [located at R_B y] are stuff-identical. Cross-count identity is stuff-identity.¹²

Since cross-count identity is an identity relation, we should expect it to have all of identity's formal features (reflexivity, transitivity, symmetry) as well as an analog of Leibniz's Law.¹³ Of course, this version of Leibniz's Law must be consistent with the idea that parts and their wholes do not exist in the same count, and so must have certain restrictions placed on it. The Cross-Count version of Leibniz's Law is thus:

¹¹ Baxter (1988b). The following is a quick summary of how Turner (2014) understands the relation between parts and locational aspects given CAI.

¹² The understanding of cross-count identity as stuff identity is also from Turner (2014)

¹³ Cf. Sider (2007, p. 56): "Whatever else one thinks about identity, Leibniz's Law must play a central role."

Cross-Count Leibniz Law (CCLL): When Φx does not entail that x and y exist in the same count or are identical to the same things: $\forall_{c_1} x \forall_{c_2} y (x \approx y \rightarrow (\Phi x \leftrightarrow \Phi y))$.¹⁴

In other words, if individual x , in one count, is cross-count identical to aspect or individual y , in another count, then every feature of x is a feature of y (and vice versa), *except* for those features that entail that the two exist in the same count, or are identical to the same thing.¹⁵

Such is the current machinery of CAI. In the next section I present Baxter’s suggestion CAI makes the grief utterances true. In doing so, I argue that to realize this proposal, CAI’s machinery must be updated to include yet another version of Leibniz’s Law.

2. Baxter’s Argument

Baxter writes “...parts are literally identical to the whole in one [count]... Thus, if the whole loses another part, the first part has lost that part...”.¹⁶ Consider Barbara-Anne. Suppose Barbara were to pass away. Anne is the survivor. Baxter’s argument starts with:

- (a) Anne is literally identical to Barbara-Anne in one count.

And ends with:

- (b) If Barbara-Anne loses a part, Anne loses that part.

Since wholes and parts exist in distinct counts, although (a) tells us that Anne is literally identical to Barbara-Anne in one count, this cannot be quite right. What *is* literally identical to Barbara-Anne in one count is a certain aspect of her: Barbara-Anne as located at R_A , the region Anne exactly occupies in a different count. Let’s understand (a) as (1), and we will take this as the first premise of Baxter’s argument:

¹⁴ Jason Turner (2014) goes into some detail explaining just what those Φx that are not permitted would be. He restricts Cross-Count Leibniz’s Law to purely qualitative Φx . Φx is purely qualitative iff it is (i) open only in x ; (ii) contains neither ‘=’ nor ‘ \approx ’; (iii) contains no count relativized quantifiers; and (iv) is with x both nominally and descriptively bare in it. x is nominally bare in Φx iff x fails to occur in the name position of an aspectival term. For instance, in ‘Aristotley[like Socrates y]’, ‘Aristotle’ occurs in the name position of the aspectival term. x is descriptively bare in Φx iff x fails to occur in the descriptive position of an aspectival term. For instance, ‘Aristotley[like Socrates y]’, ‘Socrates’ occurs in the descriptive position of the aspectival term.

¹⁵ This is in accordance with Baxter’s (1988b) claim that each “[aspect of the whole] must exactly resemble [the part of the whole it is cross-count identical to] in every way that does not entail that the [whole] and [its parts] exist in the same count, or are identical to the same things” (p. 208).

¹⁶ Baxter (2005), p. 380.

(1) Barbara-Anne = Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_A]

When Barbara passes away, Barbara-Anne loses a part.¹⁷ However, because Barbara-Anne exists in a different count from her parts, we should understand this as saying that Barbara-Anne loses a locational aspect: Barbara-Anne as located at R_B, where R_B is the region Barbara was located. So, let's take this particular instance of the antecedent of (b) as our second premise:

(2) Barbara-Anne loses Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_B].

Together, (1) and (2) are to lead us to the conclusion:

(3) So, Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_A] loses Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_B].

One may worry that (3) only goes as far as saying that an aspect of Barbara-Anne has lost an aspect, yet we want to conclude that *Anne* has experienced a loss. But remember, Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_A] is cross-count identical to Anne, so CCLL allows us to move from (3) and (4):

(4) Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_A] \approx Anne

to

(5) So, Anne loses Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_B].

Since on CAI losing a locational aspect is losing a part, this is the desired result. However, while CCLL licenses the inference from (3) and (4) to (5), neither ILL nor CCLL license the inference from (1) and (2) to (3). ILL does not, as it is restricted to range only over individuals and the identity claim in (1) is an identity between an individual and an aspect. CCLL does not, as (1) makes use of intra-count identity and CCLL governs only cross-count identity. Thus, as it stands, the machinery of Baxter's CAI does not allow us to infer that because the whole is some way, the parts are that way as well. Not only does this prevent CAI from offering an account the

¹⁷ How Barbara-Anne loses a part is a matter to be resolved. Insofar as Barbara's body remains intact, all of her stuff is still there. So, one may wonder whether we *should* think of cross-count identity as stuff-identity. (Thanks to [redacted for blind review] for bringing this to my attention). However, one might also think that in order for *x* to be part of *y*, *x* has to be related to *y* in the right way. When it comes to social wholes like Barbara-Anne, it may very well be the case that Barbara cannot be related to Barbara-Anne in the right way if she is not alive.

grief utterances, it also casts doubt on the very idea underlying CAI: that the parts are *identical* to the whole. In the following section, I introduce and develop a restricted version of Leibniz’s Law that licenses such an inference. When combined with the machinery of CAI from the previous section, the result, discussed in §4, is an updated, workable theory of CAI that both makes the grief utterances true, and better vindicates the claim that there is identity between part and whole.

3. Leibniz’s Laws and Category Mistakes

In order for CAI to make the grief utterances true it must account for the following inference:

- (1) Barbara-Anne = Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_Ay]
- (2) Barbara-Anne loses Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_By]
- (3) So, Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_Ay] loses Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_By]

It looks like what is required is:

Individual to Aspect Leibniz’s Law (I2ALL): $\forall_{cl}x\forall_{cl}y(x=y \rightarrow (\Phi x \rightarrow \Phi y))$ ¹⁸

Not only will such a principle license the inference in (1)-(3), but it will also help to vindicate claim that on this version of composition as identity, the parts are *identical* to the whole. The fact that there is currently no principle that allows us to move from a claim that the whole is some way, to the claim that the parts are that way, casts doubt on the claim that there is *identity*, even in a loose sense, between the whole and its parts. The addition of I2ALL helps bridge that gap.

Like CCLL, I2ALL requires restrictions on which predicates it holds for. For the first, consider the following: Eustace_y[salesman y] is dishonest. Eustace_y[friend y] is honest. Given that Eustace = Eustace_y[friend y], might we substitute ‘Eustace_y[friend y]’ for ‘Eustace’ in

¹⁸ Note that in I2ALL we may infer from the identity of an aspect and its individual, and the claim that the individual is F, to the claim that the aspect is F, but not vice-versa. This is because, were the latter entailment permitted, we would end up with individuals, such as Eustace, having incompatible properties. Moreover, as Baxter (2018b, p. 912) notes, it may also be the case that an aspect of an individual is some way without the individual being that way. For instance, Eustace_y[salesman y] may be dishonest, but we have already seen that this does not entail that Eustace is dishonest

‘Eustace_y[salesman *y*] is dishonest’? I don’t think we should. The result would be: ‘Eustace_y[friend *y*]_y[salesman *y*] is dishonest’: Eustace as he is a friend as he is a salesman is dishonest. But that might not be so. Eustace as he is a friend as he is a salesman might, in an effort to help his friends get the best deal possible, be very honest. Notice that in ‘Eustace_y[salesman *y*] is dishonest’, ‘Eustace’ occurs in the *nominal* position of the aspect term: ‘Eustace_y[salesman *y*]’.¹⁹ That is, ‘Eustace’ occurs in the position that names the individual of which Eustace_y[salesman *y*] is an aspect: the position outside the square brackets. So, let our first restriction be that I2ALL does not permit substitution of identicals into the nominal position of an aspect term.

Next, consider predicates like ‘has *x* as an aspect’ — call these ‘aspectival predicates’. Eustace has both Eustace_y[salesman_y] as an aspect, and Eustace_y[friend_y] as an aspect. Given the identity between an individual and its aspects, if I2ALL permitted aspectival properties, then Eustace_y[friend *y*] would be an aspect of Eustace_y[salesman *y*]. This inference seems to hold for individuals.²⁰ Clark Kent and Superman are identical, so any aspect of one is an aspect of the other. However, it is less plausible to think that Eustace_y[salesman *y*] has Eustace_y[friend *y*] as an aspect. If it did then Eustace_y[salesman *y*] would have an aspect in which Eustace_y[salesman *y*] is honest. But in the way it is presented, Eustace_y[salesman *y*] is entirely dishonest: there is no aspect of Eustace_y[salesman *y*] in which he is honest. So, I2ALL does not hold for aspectival properties.²¹

The final restriction is that only those predicates referring to *unqualified* properties of an individual may be used in I2ALL. I am about to sharpen up just what that amounts to, but for now think of an individual’s unqualified properties as those that, when predicated of it, are *not* elliptical for a predication of an aspect of an individual. For instance, Eustace’s customer’s might say ‘Eustace is dishonest!’ but we should understand this as elliptical for ‘Eustace as a car

¹⁹ See Turner (2014) for a discussion of similar restrictions that might hold for CCLL and what I have dubbed ILL.

²⁰ Baxter (2018b, p. 911) is explicit that this holds for individuals.

²¹ It might be the case that Eustace_y[salesman *y*] has Eustace_x[friend *x*] as an aspect, but we cannot infer this from the identity between Eustace_y[salesman *y*] and Eustace.

salesman is dishonest'. To see why this is required, suppose this restriction were not in place. Then insofar as what Eustace's customer's say of Eustace is true (though misleading), Eustace is dishonest. But $Eustace = Eustace_{\langle friend \rangle}$, and $Eustace_{\langle friend \rangle}$ is honest. Without this restriction I2ALL would allow us to say that $Eustace_{\langle friend \rangle}$ is honest and dishonest. But we don't want that. To help us think about what unqualified properties of an individual are, consider the following passage from Baxter:

A king [must] jail his own daughter. As law-enforcing king he supports the sentence. As loving father he does not support it ... He as father, and he considered unqualifiedly, are the same person ... But it does not follow that he, considered unqualifiedly, did not support the sentence. ... *To say that he, considered unqualifiedly, did not support the sentence is equivalent to saying: Not as anything did he support the sentence.* But from the fact that as something he did not support the sentence, it does not follow that not as anything did he support the sentence.²²

In the italicized portion of this passage Baxter suggests the following analysis of what it is to have a property unqualifiedly:

For any individual, x , and any property, F , x is *unqualifiedly* F just in case there is no aspect of x that is *not- F* , and x is F .

This analysis, however, fails to account for category mistakes. Consider Baxter's king as he is flat footed: $king_{\langle flat-footed \rangle}$. Does $king_{\langle flat-footed \rangle}$ support the sentence? I am inclined to say no. I am also inclined to say that $king_{\langle flat-footed \rangle}$ does not oppose the sentence either. Rather, $king_{\langle flat-footed \rangle}$ is the wrong sort of thing to have an opinion on the matter. But, if that's the case, then, since $king_{\langle flat-footed \rangle}$ is an aspect of the king that does not support the sentence, it would be impossible for the king to unqualifiedly support the sentence (if he were to). The king might sincerely say "With all my heart I support my daughter's sentence", yet it would remain the case that, because of his feet, the king does *not* unqualifiedly support the sentence. But, the fact that $king_{\langle flat-footed \rangle}$ fails to support the sentence shouldn't lead us to think that the king fails to support the sentence. In Baxter's original case the reason that the king did not unqualifiedly support the sentence was not because some aspect of him failed to support

²² Baxter (1989, p. 130) emphasis added.

the sentence, but because some aspect of him had a property incompatible with supporting the sentence: opposing the sentence.

Supporting the sentence and *opposing the sentence* stand in a specification relation to the property *having an opinion on the sentence*. The class of specification relations includes the determinate-determinable relation, like the one between *being red* and *being scarlet*. It also includes the genus-species relation, like the one between *being a dog* and *being a chihuahua*, and the conjunct-conjunction relation between *being a dog* and *being a red dog*.²³ In each example the latter property is more specific than the former. Call each of these more specific properties a *specifier property* of the more general one. Some specifier properties are incompatible with each other. *being red* is a specifier property incompatible with *being blue*, *being married* is a specifier property incompatible with *being a bachelor* (given that *being a bachelor* is the conjunctive property *being unmarried and being a man*). *Supporting the sentence* is a specifier property incompatible with *opposing the sentence*.

While it is true that king_[flat-footed y] does not support the sentence, this is not because it possesses a specifier property incompatible with supporting the sentence. Instead, it is because king_[flat-footed y] is not the sort of thing that has an opinion on the matter. We can now distinguish two ways to be *not-F*. One is to possess a specifier property incompatible with *F-ness*. Another is to fail to be the sort of thing to which *F-ness* applies, as in the case of category mistakes. This is the case with king_[flat-footed y]'s failure to support the sentence.

When considering unqualified properties, the condition that there is no aspect of **x** that is *not-F* should be understood as: there is no aspect of **x** that has a specifier property incompatible with being-*F*. Thus, we may still say that the king unqualifiedly supports the sentence, despite king_[flat-footed y]'s failure to do so. That being so, let's use the following definition of what it is to be unqualifiedly *F*:

For any individual, *x*, and any property, *F*, *x* is *unqualifiedly F* just in case there is no aspect of *x* that has a specifier property incompatible with being *F*, and *x* is *F*.

²³ The terminology of 'specification relation' and 'conjunct-conjunction relation' comes from Wilson (2017).

So, let's understand I2ALL as:

I2ALL: For Φx such that (a) ' y ' is not substituted into the nominal position of an aspectival term of ' Φx ', (b) ' Φ ' is not an aspectival predicate, and (c) ' Φ ' refers to an unqualified property of x :

$$\forall_{c1} x \forall_{c1} y (x=y \rightarrow (\Phi x \rightarrow \Phi y))$$

Note that a feature of I2ALL is that it licenses the claim that King_y[flat-footed y] *does* support the sentence, despite the fact that this is a category mistake. While this might sound odd, it is this feature that allows us to say that Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_A y] loses Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_B y]. Well, will only if *loses Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_B y]* is an unqualified property of Barbara-Anne. I turn to this issue in the next section.

4. Losing a part unqualifiedly

I2ALL permits the inference in (1)-(3) only if *loses Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_B y]* is an unqualified property of Barbara-Anne. One may object that it is not. The surviving locational aspect, Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_A y], *remains entire*, where this is understood as diachronically maintaining its locational aspects.²⁴ Surely *remains entire* is incompatible with *loses Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_B y]*. So, *loses Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_B y]* is not an unqualified property of Barbara-Anne. So, I2ALL will not license the needed inference.

However, I don't think that Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_A y]'s remaining entire *is* a matter of her possessing a specifier property incompatible with *loses Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_B y]*. In order to lose something, one needs to first have it. One needs to be the sort of thing that *can* lose it. Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_A y] is not the sort of thing that *can* lose Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_B y], because Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_B y] was never an aspect of Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_A y].²⁵ Moreover, insofar as we are talking about persons, it seems impossible for one person to ever be a locational aspect of the other. Human persons are not the sorts of things that have other human persons as parts. I maintain that there is no direct incompatibility here. Instead,

²⁴ At least this seems so for those aspects that correspond to the parts in a different count.

²⁵ Compare this to how my chesterfield is not the sort of thing that is a fast runner precisely because it is not the sort of thing that can run at all.

since Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_A y] never had and never could have Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_B y] as an aspect, it is like a category mistake to say that Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_A y] loses Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_B y]. But, as is the case with the king and king_y[flat-footed y], I2ALL permits such category mistakes. So, it looks as though the property *loses Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_B y]* is an unqualified property of Barbara-Anne.

However, one might think that that was too quick. We have been making use of I2ALL in which ‘Φx’ is ‘x loses Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_B y]’ But, since Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_B y] is a locational aspect, ‘x loses Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_B y]’ entails ‘x loses a locational aspect’. This is surely incompatible with ‘x remains entire’, which is true of Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_A y] — all of its locational aspects are still there.²⁶

I suggest two responses. Each points to an ambiguity in ‘x loses a locational aspect’. The matter of which is more promising is left to the reader. The first response appeals to the intrinsic/extrinsic property distinction. ‘loses a locational aspect’ refers to the property *loses an aspect*, which may be had intrinsically or extrinsically. Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_A y] *loses an aspect* extrinsically, for it has this property only because of its relation to Barbara-Anne. Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_A y] has *remains entire* intrinsically, for it is in virtue of how it is itself that it remains entire — all of *its* sub-regions, and so *its* locational aspects, are still there. When we read ‘Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_A y] loses a locational aspect’ we should understand this as ‘Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_A y] (extrinsically) loses a locational aspect’. When we read ‘Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_A y] remains entire’, we should understand this as ‘Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_A y] (intrinsically) remains entire’. According to this response, the troubling kinds of incompatibility are those that manifest themselves either both intrinsically or both extrinsically. Because Anne

²⁶ We can understand locational aspects of a locational aspect as sub-regions of latter.

has one property intrinsically and the other extrinsically, there is no troubling contradiction here.²⁷

The second response locates the ambiguity in whose or what's aspect was lost. Consider the phrase 'loses a set of keys'. 'Marcus loses a set of keys' is true regardless of whether he loses his own keys, or someone else's. This response maintains that 'loses a locational aspect' is like that as well. '*x* loses a locational aspect' is true regardless of whether *x* loses its own locational aspect, or something else's. In the case of Barbara-Anne, Barbara-Anne loses its own locational aspect. However, Barbara-Anne_y[located at *R_A* *y*] has *not* lost one of its own aspects, it loses one of Barbara-Anne's. This is perfectly compatible with Barbara-Anne_y[located at *R_A* *y*] having the property of *maintaining all of its own locational aspects*. So, once properly disambiguated, Barbara-Anne_y[located at *R_A* *y*]'s remaining entire is perfectly compatible with her losing a locational aspect.

Even if Barbara-Anne_y[located at *R_A* *y*] does remain entire, we need not understand this it possessing a specifier property incompatible with *loses Barbara-Anne_y[located at *R_A* *y*]*. While truly demonstrating that *no* aspect of Barbara-Anne has a specifier property incompatible with this property requires further argumentation, what has been said here undermines the strongest motivation to think that this is not the case, namely, that some surviving aspect remains entire.

Thus far, I have extended the machinery of CAI to include I2ALL, which has resulted in a view distinct from the one found in Baxter. However, my intention was not to cast doubt on Baxter's insights. Rather, it was to "take the spirit of Baxter's account past the letter of it"²⁸ in a manner that can account for the truth of the grief utterances, and better make good on the claim

²⁷ With the addition of aspects how we should understand the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction becomes a bit more tricky. I think that when it comes to *unqualified* properties of individuals, we should understand the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction as usual. But not all properties of individuals are unqualified properties. Again, consider Eustace_y[salesman *y*]. It is inaccurate to say that Eustace is dishonest, but correct to say that Eustace_y[salesman *y*] is dishonest. Being dishonest is a qualified property of Eustace. Suppose that Eustace is only dishonest as a salesman. Then in this case I think that what the correct thing to say about the case is that we should say that while *being dishonest* is an intrinsic property of Eustace_y[salesman *y*], it is not a feature of Eustace, the individual, at all.

²⁸ I thank an anonymous referee for this turn of phrase.

that there is *identity* between part and whole. In a recent article on the neo-Confucian view that identity holds between the universe and everything in it, Baxter distinguishes between one's broader self (the universe) and one's narrow self (as a single, independent individual).²⁹ The narrow self, Baxter argues, can be understood as an aspect of broader self. Applying this to the loss of the loved one, it is one's broader self, the universe, that loses a part. One's narrow self may not have, for, although identical to the broader self, as an aspect of the latter, it may differ from it. The addition of I2ALL allows us to say that the narrow self also loses a part. Yet, if we put aside the goal of explaining the neo-Confucian view, we need not appeal to mystical notions like the broader self and the narrow self in order to account for the truth of the grief utterances. We are able to do so even if we are construed just as our narrow selves.³⁰ We need only note that we can form complexes with other individuals. When we do, we are parts of that complex, with the individuals that make it up in one count, and the complex in another. As parts of the complex, we are cross-count identical to locational aspects of it, which in turn, are intra-count identical to the complex. Given I2ALL, if the complex loses a part, the remaining aspects lose a part. Given CCLL, if the aspects lose a part, the surviving individuals, in a different count, lose that part.

Recall that the identity between a whole and its aspects is intended to be *literal* identity. In which case, it should be symmetric, transitive, and reflexive, but also governed by *some* principle like Leibniz's Law. It is this latter feature of identity that sets it apart from other equivalence relations. Thus, the addition of Individual to Aspect Leibniz's Law supports the claim that there is literal identity between an individual and its aspects. Once we are able to infer that because the whole is some way, the aspect is that way as well, we can then use Cross-Count Leibniz Law to infer that the part, in a different count, is that way too (when licensed to do so). This in turn

²⁹See Baxter (2018a)

³⁰ Thank you to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to discuss this component of Baxter's view, and for pointing out to me that that this view seems committed to a "mystical" distinction between the broader self and the narrow self in a way that the view I have developed is not.

helps bolster the claim that on CAI, the whole is identical to its parts. That CAI offers an account of the very palpable sense that in losing a loved one, we lose a part of ourselves provides extra evidence in favour of its utility and truth.

5. Desiderata for an Account of the Grief Utterances

I have argued that, with the addition of I2ALL, CAI makes the grief utterances true. Recall that the argument from §2 concludes that Anne loses Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_{By}]. If *losing Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_{By}]* is an unqualified property of Anne, then, with the addition of I2ALL, analogous arguments will allow us to conclude that *each and every aspect* of Anne loses Barbara-Anne Barbara-Anne_y[located at R_{By}]. This is in accordance with the survivor's profound sense that the loss of her beloved affects every remaining element of her life. So, not only does CAI make the grief utterances true, it does so in a manner that captures the extent to which losing a loved one affects us. However, despite this success, there are three objections I would like to briefly address. Each highlights a limitation of CAI's ability to fully capture the sense in which losing a loved one is losing a part of oneself. These objections, together with the observation that CAI successfully captures the sense that losing a loved one affects every element of the survivor's life, bring into focus some desiderata to keep in mind when providing an account of the grief utterances.

The first objection is that because CAI requires taking on the commitments of counts, aspects, two kinds of identity, and multiple versions of Leibniz's law, if adopting this system is required to account for the truth of the grief utterances, then it is better to understand the grief utterances metaphorically. However, the world we live in and experience is one in which the grief utterances *seem true* in a non-metaphorical sense. The grief utterances are ubiquitous, and the sense of loss prompting them deeply felt. To give up on accounting for the grief utterances is to give up on accounting for the world as it appears to us. I don't think we should forego that project until we have a better sense of what alternatives to CAI there might be. What this objection does point to is a first desiderata for an account of the grief utterances: a compelling

account of the grief utterances will require us to take on as few substantial metaphysical commitments as possible.

The next two objections question whether CAI accurately captures the phenomenology prompting the grief utterances and our ordinary thinking about loss. Recall two things that were noted in the opening paragraphs of this paper: first, the grief we experience at the loss of our loved ones differs significantly from the sadness felt at the death of a stranger; second, that the phenomenology accompanying the grief utterance is that the survivor *herself* is no longer complete. The CAI account has a difficult time explaining these facts.

In our ordinary thinking about loss and grief, we would find it odd, disingenuous, or confused were someone to report that the death of a near stranger was literally as much a loss to them as the death of their life-long friend. Since our ordinary way of thinking about loss treats these cases differently, another desideratum for an account of the grief utterances is that it can explain why this is so. Yet, CAI is consistent with the assumption that any collection of persons compose some whole.³¹ When combined, the result is that whenever one member of the collection dies, each survivor loses a part.³² If this is so, then the loss of strangers can literally affect the survivor as much as the loss of their closest loved ones. Baxter takes this to be a virtue of CAI, as it captures Donne's sentiment that "any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankinde".³³ But, this is at odds with how we ordinarily think about grief and loss. CAI would better account for our ordinary thinking about grief and loss were its application

³¹ This is consistent with compositional universalism, according to which any collection of any things composes some whole. It is also Epstein's (2017) view of social groups.

³² It is often assumed that composition as identity entails compositional universalism, the view that any collection of objects compose some further objects. McDaniel (2010) argues that this assumption is false. What I claim is that CAI is consistent with at least a restricted form of universalism according to which any collection of people forms some whole. This leaves CAI, in its current formulation, unable to explain how a loss of a stranger is different from the loss of a loved one.

³³ Baxter (2005, p. 365) citing "Devotions upon Emergent Occasions," in Charles Coffin, ed., *The Complete Poetry and Selected Prose of John Donne* (New York: Modern Library, 2001), p. 446.

restricted to only certain wholes, perhaps those social complexes that correspond to individuals in certain intimate relationships.³⁴

Finally, the CAI solution cannot account for the fact that the bereaved's phenomenology is that she herself is a primary bearer of the loss. According to the CAI solution, the survivor's loss stems from the fact that some whole, of which she was a part, lost a part. This makes the loss to one's self derivative, and the whole being the primary bearer of that loss. But, the loss that the survivor experiences is not like that. The loss one feels is that one's own self is no longer complete, regardless of what wholes one is part of. This points to a further desideratum when accounting for the grief utterances: a literal understanding of the utterances should account, in some way, for the phenomenological experience that one is a primary bearer of that loss. While CAI may be able to provide a literal understanding of why it is true that one loses a part of oneself, it does not do so in a way that resonates with the felt experience of grief.

Still, as I mentioned at the beginning of this section, CAI has the resources to capture the extent to which the loss of a loved one affects us. On CAI, every aspect of oneself suffers that same loss. This points to a final desideratum for a competing account of the grief utterances: it ought to do just as well at capturing the sense that the loss of a loved one affects every detail of the survivor's life.

6. Conclusion

The CAI account of the truth of the grief utterances required an additional Leibniz's Law like principle in order to make good on its promise to account for the truth of the grief utterances. We have just seen that even with this requisite principle, CAI is limited in its ability to fully capture the sense in which we lose a part of ourselves in the death of a loved one. Still, considering CAI's strengths and weaknesses provides guidance for philosophers interested in the accounting for the truth of the grief utterances.

³⁴ Unfortunately, a full discussion of how to draw this restriction, and what would justify us doing so, is beyond the scope of this paper. Baxter (2005, p. 381) suggests we might be able to account for additional unity of some such wholes by using the model of instantiation found in his (2001). In turn, the additional unity of said whole might then account for the difference in the experience of the loss.

However, just as the considerations regarding CAI's limited success in fully accounting for grief utterances sheds light on what a fully satisfactory account will look like, the question of what, if anything, accounts for the truth of the grief utterances, has allowed us to make headway on understanding CAI. Even if CAI does not offer a fully satisfactory account of the grief utterances, the work accomplished in this paper contributes to the larger project of understanding composition as a form of distributive identity, an important view in the metaphysics of composition and identity. The addition of I2ALL, made in an attempt to account for the grief utterances, allows us to better understand the claim that each part is identical to the whole. As a result, the idea that there is distributive identity between a whole and its parts has been made a stronger contender as an account of composition as identity.

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